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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
W.

B: RUSSELL,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No.
7647

THE OGDEN UNION RAILWAY AND
DEPOT COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
As stated by plaintiff in the first sentence of his answering brief, there is no dispute between the parties
with respect to the facts and we will refrain in this reply
brief from all unnecessary reference thereto.
The plaintiff has followed the pattern of the defendant's main brief in discussing the case under Points I to
VII, inclusive, and we will adhere to this arrangement al-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

though we do not consider it necessary to reply to the
matters discussed by plaintiff under all seven points of
issue.
POINT I.
Our position in connection with this assignment was
that the court erred in admitting the transcript of the
proceedings at the official investigation as substantive
evidence of the facts therein stated, and in connection
therewith we complain at a later point in the brief of the
court's deciding the case solely and exclusively upon this
improperly admitted evidence. We think that the case of
Slocum v. Delaware, Lackawana & Western Railroad Co.,
339 U. S. 239, 94 L. Ed. 534, 70 S. Ct. 577, has firmly
established the procedure to be followed by state and
federal courts in handling controversies under collective
bargaining agreements with carriers. The plaintiff has
devoted considerable space in his brief to explaining the
holding of the Supreme Court of the United States in the
Slocum case. As we understand plaintiff's contention, it
is that the holding in the Slocum case does not limit the
jurisdiction of trial courts merely to the hearing of an
ordinary common law action for damages for breach of
contract under the type of contract in question. This case
is the same as Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., 312 U. S.
630, 85 L. Ed. 1089, 61 S. Ct. 754, in that it is a simple
common law action for breach of contract. The plaintiff
endeavors to make a distinction between the Moore case
and the Slocum case and Order of Railway Conductors v.
Southern Railway Co., 339 U. S. 255, 94 L. Ed. 542, 70
S. Ct. 585, on the grounds that the two latter cases in-
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volved jurisdictional disputes. The Supreme Court of the
United States in the Slocum case specifically eliminated
room for any such distinction. It discussed the Moore case
extensively in its efforts to carefully explain just what
was held in the Slocum case. We have covered this matter
fairly completely, but because counsel undertakes to tell
us what the Supreme Court held we would like again to
refer to the language of the Court itself where it is said:
"Our holding here is not inconsistent with our
holding in Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., 312 U.
S. 630. Moore was discharged by the railroad. He
could have challenged the validity of his discharge
before the Board, seeking reinstatement and back
pay. Instead he chose to accept the railroad's action
in discharging him as final, thereby ceasing to be
an employee, and brought suit claiming damages for
breach of contract. As we there held, the Railway
Labor Act does not bar courts from adjudicating such
cases. A common law or statutory action for wrongful discharge differs from any remedy which the
board has power to provide and does not involve
questions of future relations between the railroad
and its other employees." * * *
"We hold that the jurisdiction of the Board to
adjust grievances and disputes of the type here involved is exclusive. The holding of the Moore case
does not conflict with this decision, and no contrary
inference should be drawn from any language in the
Moore opinion."
The case before this court differs in no particular at
all from the issues presented and finally adjudicated in the
Moore case and we therefore think that this court is bound
by the application of the Slocum case as the Supreme Court
of the United States says it should be made. The Supreme
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Court of the United States took occasion to point out that
the New York Court of Appeals fell into the error of assuming state courts had the right to adjudicate disputes arising
out of a carrier-union collective bargaining agreement,
which is the ultimate result of the distinction which plaintiff in his brief is trying to make. Mr. Justice Black in reversing, stated:
"The majority (of the New York Court of Appeals) thought that our opinion in Moore v. Illinois
Central R. Co., 312 U. S. 630, left state courts free
to adjudicate disputes arising out of a carrier-union
collective bargaining agreement without obtaining
the Board's interpretation of that agreement."
Counsel for the plaintiff cite a number of cases at pages
13, 14 and 15 of their brief in their effort to nullify this
language in the Slocum case. It should be pointed out, however, that these cases were all decided before the Slocum
case and the courts in the cited cases thought they were
following Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., as the New York
Court of Appeals did, and were making the same mistake in
doing so.
Apparently the reason for the plaintiff's strenuous effort to establish that the Slocum case has no application is
because of his concern over the provision of the contract
which he contends provides the measure of damages for
breach. The contract does not provide that upon breach
thereof the plaintiff shall be paid for all time lost, but it
provides for the payment of all time lost upon his reinstatement to his former employment. For this reason plaintiff contends in the face of the Slocum case that the trial
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court had a right to reinstate and therefore had a right to
award damages "for all time lost." If the court had a right
to reinstate and did not reinstate, why then did it award the
plaintiff "all time lost?"
On the precise matter involved under Point I, namely,
that the court erred in admitting the unsworn transcript
as substantive evidence and the corollary thereof, viz, refusing to allow the defendant to introduce any evidence
whatsoever as to the merits of its action in discharging
plaintiff, we cited the cases of Tennison v. St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry. Co., ... Mo.... , 228 S. W. 2d 718, and Johnson v. Thompson, . . . Mo. . .. , 236 S. W. 2d 1. Both of
these cases support our position and we confess that we
were unable to find any others in the books. We did not find
any to the contrary and counsel for the plaintiff has cited
none. Here again the plaintiff, unable to find any law in
support of his position, attempts to distinguish these cases
from the present case. The agreement before this court
provides, "No yardman will be suspended or dismissed without first having a fair and impartial hearing and his guilt
established." The agreements involved in the cited cases
provided that, "Trainmen shall not be suspended, discharged, or unfavorable entries made against their records without just and sufficient cause." Counsel even suggests that
just and sufficient cause under the latter cases can be
found without an investigation. The fact of the matter is
that investigations were held in both cases and it is well
known to all with any acquaintance with agreements under
the Railway Labor Act, that under all types of collective
bargaining agreements between carriers and employes,
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hearings are contemplated and are held where violations are
charged and where it is anticipated discipline may be assessed. We are unable to see any distinction of substance
between the expressions "his guilt established" and "without just and sufficient cause." Whatever the language used,
these agreements all presuppose the right of management to
discipline its employes for violation of not only its operating rules, but to discipline them for many things not specifically provided for. As the citations in our main brief show,
the Railway Labor Act never contemplated that management should be deprived of the right to discipline its employes and to dismiss them for any cause sufficient to the
management, so long as the management did not act arbitrarily and in bad faith. Does the expression "his guilt
established" mean to the satisfaction of the employe or
the employer and the employe both? It would be ridiculous
to suppose that it did. Does it mean then that his guilt must
be established to the satisfaction of the management "beyond a reasonable doubt" or "by a preponderance of the
evidence?" There is no basis whatever in court decisions or
the holdings of the National Railroad Adjustment Board for
so concluding. In our main brief we cited a number of holdings of the Railroad Adjustment Board itself, wherein
they have consistently taken the position that even though
they had been sitting upon the matter in the original instance
and would have decided the case otherwise or imposed a
different or less severe penalty, they will not disturb the
decision of management or the penalty imposed unless it
clearly appears that the management in acting as it did, did
so arbitrarily and in bad faith. The attempt to apply strict
legal procedure to hearings which are conducted by laymen
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and to a review thereof by the courts is wholly unwarranted and has never been contemplated in connection with
collective bargaining agreements under the Railway Labor
Act. Generally, the principles and the decisions of courts
have furnished valuable guides in determining the reciprocal
rights and duties of the parties under such agreements, but
the subject matter being dealt with and the fact that laymen
on both sides are attempting to adjust their disputes,
necessitates some indulgence rather than strict adherence to
legal principles. This is the underlying philosophy of the
Slocum case. In asking for a strict legal approach against
the defendant, counsel ignores this underlying philosophy.
Plaintiff in this action has throughout, successfully sought
the widest indulgence for himself and has insisted upon and
secured the strictest sort of technical compliance with the
contract on the part of the defendant company. In our main
brief we pointed out that the rule of strict construction
against the defendant is unwarranted for the reason that
defendant did not draw the contract. It was drawn around
a conference table by the parties, where neither had any
advantage over the other.
But even so, there was substantial competent evidence
at the investigation warranting the action of the defendant
in dismissing plaintiff and on familiar principles applicable
to decisions of administrative boards, which defendant's
management is not, the court should not disturb the findings. The plaintiff in his brief says that there is nothing
involved in this case except the question of whether or not
the plaintiff absented himself without written leave for a
period in excess of ten days. He adds, gratuitously, the
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expression "wilfully or knowingly." We agree, except
that there is no room for injecting into this case under the
contract any claim that the defendant must establish plaintiff so absented himself "wilfully and knowingly." These
words do not appear any place in the contract. What are
the facts? We do not propose to rehash the matter, but there
is absolutely no question but that the plaintiff was off the
job in excess of ten days without written permission, which
he knew was necessary to obtain and which he did not
obtain and made no effort to obtain. The entire case is that
simple and on the basis of that showing alone, which was
admitted by the plaintiff himself at the hearing and is undisputed now, the management was justified in dismissing
him, and there is no evidence whatsoever that such action
was taken arbitrarily or in bad faith so as to warrant its
reversal.
POINT II.
The plaintiff in his brief has little to say about this
point wherein we contend that the court should have granted
defendant's motion for a nonsuit. If we are right in our
contention that the trial court committed error in admitting
the transcript of the unsworn testimony at the investigation
as substantive evidence of the facts therein stated, or wrong
therein, but right in our contention that it did not support
a finding that the management acted arbitrarily and in bad
faith in dismissing plaintiff, then of course the nonsuit
should have been granted. If we are right in either of these
contentions, the record was absolutely destitute of any evidence which would support a cause of action. We would
like to remark in passing that we think the evidence at the
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close of the plaintiff's case was absolutely destitute of any
evidence of damage. Counsel for plaintiff make the statement under Point II of their brief that it was admitted by
the parties that "under the collective bargaining agreement
defendant's right to discharge was limited by the provisions
of Rule 38." We do not recall ever having made such a
ridiculous admission and we have been unable to find in
the record where we have done so. It is not the fact, and
we have never admitted it to be the fact. Plaintiff argues
the existence of the agreement and the fact of discharge
alone "make out a prima facie case fo:r recovery." Plaintiff also contends under this point that the burden was upon
the defendant to establish that the discharge was in accordance with the contract. This is an argument of desperation,
made in an effort to justify the palpable error committed in
refusing to grant defendant's motion for a nonsuit, and is
undeserving of further comment.
POINT III.
Our contention here that the court erred in limiting
!he evidence upon the question of breach solely to what
appeared in the unsworn transcript of the testimony a~ th~
9fficial investigation and in refusing to permit the defendant to prove that parts of the plaintiff's testimony even in
this transcript were false, is, we believe, sufficiently covered
in our main brief and herein under Point I to make it unnecessary to elaborate further upon this matter.
POINT IV.
In answer to our contention that the court in any event
should have allowed as a deduction the sum of $7,774.39,
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which we managed to prove had been earned in other em·ployment by the plaintiff, the plaintiff contends that the
parties had stipulatedin the contract that damages for
breach thereof involving plaintiff's dismissal would be
measured by "all time lost." We have no quarrel with plaintiff on the legal proposition that parties to a contract may
stipulate therein as to the measure of damages in the event,
and only in the event, that the amount stipulated for can
be construed as damages contemplated or reasonably to be
anticipated from the breach thereof. Otherwise, and in the
event the damages are in excess of what it can be said was
reasonably to be contemplated by the parties as flowing
from a breach, the amount fixed becomes a penalty which
the courts have refused to enforce. These are elementary
and familiar principles of the law of damages. If we assume, as plaintiff says, that the contract contains a stipulation for damages and that the damages are "all time lost"
and nothing more, so that even though one earned in other
employment far in excess of what his wages may have
amounted to, he may still recover the full amount of his
wages, then it is not the kind of stipulation in the contract
which courts will enforce. It is a penalty and nothing else.
Such an interpretation as plaintiff would apply destroys
the character of the expression "pay for all time lost" as a
valid stipulation for liquidated damages. The contract does
not provide for liquidated damages as awarded and as contended for by plaintiff. It provides, and we reiterate, that
if "dismissal is found to be unjust, yardmen shall be reinstated and paid for all time lost." It contemplates payment for "all time lost" only in the event the plaintiff is
returned to service. It necessarily follows that unless he is
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returned to service he is not entitled to any time lost within
the contemplation or the terms of this collective bargaining
agreement. As pointed out in our main brief, the Railroad
Adjus~ment Board has on occasion required the payment of
all time lost upon reinstatement being ordered, but it has
just as frequently refused to order the carrier to pay for all
time lost-sometimes ordering a portion of the time lost
to be paid, sometimes ordering reinstatement without any
requirement that the employe be paid for time lost. But one
will search in vain for a case where it has ordered payment
of any lost time without ordering reinstatement. It does
not have such jurisdiction. Carrier-employe contracts do
not contemplate or provide for such a result, that is, an
award of damages without reinstatement. The right to
damages lies only in the law. It exists because of the relationship of employer and employe. That is why the Supreme
Court of the United States in the Slocum case held the dismissed employe has a common law right of action in the
courts, but nothing else. It may be thought that the defendant cannot complain because only a part of the penalty is
imposed upon it in requiring it to pay the plaintiff for all
time lost without reinstatement. This is not sound, however, because the payment for time lost is dependent upon
reinstatement. It is quite apparent that the penalty imposed
upon a carrier to pay for "all time lost" was contemplated
only in the event the employe had been wronged to the extent that he was to be exonerated completely or in part and
returned to his employment. The plaintiff in this case never
sought reinstatement at the hands of the Railroad Adjustment Board, and although his counsel resents our referring
to the matter, there cannot be any doubt but that the
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reason therefor was his lack of confidence in getting the
very charitably disposed Railroad Adjustment Board toreinstate him, which would also have meant no award of
damages. This was particularly true in view of the fact that
the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, the other party
to this contract with the defendant, believed that the plaintiff was not entitled to reinstatement or at least this union
refused, as we offered to prove, to consent to reinstating the
plaintiff. As pointed out in our main brief in the case of
Eubanks v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co., (Texas) 59 S.
W. 2d 825, the expression "pay for all time lost" means
nothing more, and at the most as therein stated, than an
obligation of the railroad company to pay such damages
as are occasioned by lost earnings. To place thereon the
construction contended for by plaintiff would be to give
this provision the character of a penalty and not one for
liquidated damages reasonably contemplated by the parties
for breach.
POINT V.
The agreement here provided that, "Reinstatement will
not be permitted after the expiration of six months from date
of dismissal, unless agreeable to the management and the
general committee , * * *." We offered to prove that the
general committee meant the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen. The plaintiff in his brief, at page 42, contends that
this provision relates to a situation where the dismissal was
"rightful." The above quoted provision of the contract
makes no such distinction and when the on-the-property
operation of this contract between the carrier on one side,
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and the union with its philosophy of seniority on the other
side, is considered, it seems clear to us that no such distinction was intended. The plaintiff says, "Upon reinstatement
an employee assumes his former seniority rating." In point
of fact this is sometimes true and sometimes it is not true
and it is not determined necessarily by the question of
whether or not an employe was rightfully or wrongfully dismissed. Many men are rightfully dismissed from service
and are thereafter returned to service by the company of its
own accord, and sometimes because it is so ordered by the
Railroad Adjustment Board. Sometimes they are restored to
seniority rights, and sometimes they are returned to work
with impaired seniority rights, which is simply one method
of imposing penalty. There is no evidence of the fact, but it
would seem reasonable to suppose that this provision was
placed in the contract at the solicitation of the union. Certainly, the carrier would have no object in insisting upon
the provision. Evidently the union insisting upon such a
provision considered that six months was ample time for an
employe to present to them, so that they could present to the
company, an application for reinstatement. The union did
not want an employe who had a clear right of reinstatement to remain off the job indefinitely, thus acquiring seniority to the prejudice of other employes, without earning it,
and then to be reinstated at any time in the future that suited
his convenience. The defendant in this case entered into
a binding engagement with the BofRT on this matter and it
is binding upon the plaintiff in this action. We say that we
could not have reinstated the plaintiff without the consent
of the BofRT had we so desired without breaching this contract and giving rise to a cause of action against us by every
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man who was set down one place on the seniority roster because of such action. We said in our main brief, and we
say again, that we were "maintaining the integrity of the
agreement" in refusing to reinstate the plaintiff under all
the circumstances and in view of this provision of the contract, and are content to leave it to this court to say whether
or not such an argument is "frivolous": as characterized
by plaintiff's counsel. This is simply another instance of the
plaintiff seeking to hold the defendant strictly to account
on a portion of the contract and at the same time urging
that the defendant can disregard other provisions of the
contract, procedural as well as substantive, when it would
relieve the plaintiff of his own default. We think that we
are bound by all the provisions of the contract, including
the provisions which are purely procedural, and we think
the plaintiff is likewise bound by all of the provisions of the
contract.
POINT VI.
We here contended that the plaintiff was without any
right to maintain an action for breach of the contract, but
argued that if such a right at the time plaintiff commenced
E-is action did exist he was estopped from asserting the sam~.
Plaintiff says in his brief that, "Apparently two propositions are involved. First, that Mr. McDaniels in writing
the defendant as he did under date of May 14, 1944 (Defendant's Exhibit 3) in effect released the defendant from
any liability to plaintiff, and second, if that letter did not
constitute a release, plaintiff's failure to prosecute any
further claim until May 22, 1949, when this action was
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commenced, effected an estoppel." We may be at fault for
not making it clear in our main brief that under Point VI
we were asserting two propositions, and we would like to
make it clear at this time that we do contend first, that the
defendant was released from any liability to the plaintiff
because of what amounted to an agreement between the
parties to consider the controversy as closed and settled, and
secondly, if such was not the result of the termination of
negotiations between the parties, then the plaintiff is now
estopped to maintain this action.
Much of plaintiff's brief on these two points is concerned with the alleged lack of authority of Mr. McDaniels,
Acting Vice President of the Switchmen's Union of North
America, to represent the plaintiff. It is claimed particularly
that McDaniels had no authority to advise the defendant that
the grievance was being withdrawn and that the defendant
might treat the matter as closed. We cannot agree with
counsel in his statement that, "The broadest scope of an
agency of the type here involved is that which exists between an attorney and client." The relationship of attorney
and client is an agency which is peculiarly inhibited by
custom, ethics and statutory law. The relationship between
the plaintiff and Mr. McDaniels was an agency in its broadest sense. We are not relying upon any implied authority
in McDaniels to admit that the plaintiff falsified at the hearing, to withdraw the grievance and advise us that the case
was closed. McDaniels was expressly authorized in writing
by the plaintiff Russell as his "agent and representative in
the prosecution of the grievance claimed," to handle all
"further prosecution of the grievance," and to "negotiate,
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adjust and dispose of the grievance claim in any manner."
At no time did the plaintiff ever make any attempt to revoke this authority, as of course he had a right to do. He
never took the witness stand to deny McDaniels' authority,
or limit it in any way, nor to speak out in his own defense
at the trial when publicly charged with false testimony
and fraudulent conduct.
We think that the forebearance on the part of the defendant to progress its dispute before the Railroad Adjustment Board, as it had a right to do, after it was advised
that it might treat the plaintiff's case as closed, constitutes consideration and is adequate to support what is the
equivalent of a binding release.
But if the factual situation is such that it does not
fit nicely into some common legal category we see no reason
why it is not proper to urge, as we do, that the facts are
such that in all equity and justice the plaintiff should be
estopped from now maintaining this action. Upon a rereading of our argument of our Point VI in the main brief we
feel that we therein fully meet every argument plaintiff
advances on this matter of estoppel.
POINT VII.
Whether the findings and conclusions are supported by
competent evidence and the judgment supported by the
findings and conclusions depends entirely upon the decision
of the court on the matters that have already been argued.
We will therefore not prolong this reply by a further discussion thereof.
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CONCLUSION
The importance of the decision in this case not only
to the defendant, but to all employers and employes as well,
who work under collective bargaining agreements, cannot
be overestimated. In this particular instance the decision
is not alone a matter for concern to the defendant carrier,
but is of concern to the other party to the contract, the
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, which we offered to
prove is in agreement with the carrier on the propriety of
defendant's refusal to reinstate the plaintiff. There is no
controversy between the parties to this contract-the trainmen's union and the defendant company, although we
admit the right of the individual employe to disagree. It
is a matter of the utmost concern to the defendant carrier
and will be to other carriers and other employers who maintain collective bargaining agreements to learn whether or
not they still have the right to discipline employes, so long
as they act in good faith in doing so.
It might be helpful to the court if in conclusion we very
briefly summarize what has transpired in this suit. The
appeal involves not only the facts as they appear in the
record, but the competency, materiality and propriety of
much evidence which we offered and which was rejected.
We think the defendant in this case did not have its day in
court. The trial court first, over objection, admits in evidence the hearsay and unsworn testimony given at the investigation; not for impeachment, not as an admission, not
for any lawful purpose we can perceive, but as evidence of
the truth of the facts therein stated. Based on this hearsay
evidence, the trial court proceeds to decide that the plain-
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tiff was "not guilty" of the charge made against him and
that the defendant breached the collective bargaining agreement in dismissing him. This was all the evidence offered by
plaintiff on the propriety of the dismissal and the court
refused to hear a single word of evidence from the defendant on the subject. For all we know, the court may have
decided that plaintiff was "not guilty"-"beyond a reasonable doubt," or guilt was not established by a "preponderance of the evidence." It is perhaps immaterial, for certainly
the court did not ask itself as it should-does the record
show that the defendant has acted arbitrarily or in bad
faith, or its decision would have been otherwise. Assuming,
of course, that the court had the right, which we deny, to
decide the case on the bare record of the investigation. Thus
convicting the defendant without any opportunity whatsoever to be heard, the court turns to the question of damages.
Without any evidence thereon offered by the plaintiff, who
had the burden to prove his damages, and with only our
stipulation that plaintiff could have worked every day had
he so desired, the court gives the plaintiff his gross wages for
the full period of time-365 days a year. The "period" is
over four and a half years and not over five years, as we
inadvertently stated in our main brief, and which minuscule
error on our part was resented by counsel. So much, and
that is all, for plaintiff's case.
After thus deciding the case prima facie in favor of
the- plaintiff, the court refused to allow the defendant to
introduce any evidence on the question of damages. The
court refused to allow as a deduction the sum of $7,77 4.39,
the amount proved without contradiction to have been earned
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by plaintiff in other employment. The court refused to give
any consideration to the fact shown by the transcript itself
that the plaintiff worked a total of only 62 days in the first
six months of 1945 preceding his dismissal. The court refused to permit a showing that the plaintiff worked less
than half-time at any time during his employment with the
defendant since the year 1941 as having a bearing on the
probabilities of his working every day, 365 days a year, from
August, ·1945, to September, 1950. The court refused to permit a showing by Dr. Keith Stratford, company doctor, that
plaintiff falsified at the hearing relative to the nature and
extent of his alleged illness. The court refused to permit
the defendant to show that the plaintiff had falsified as to
his engaging in lucrative outside employment during the
10-day period involved in the investigation and during
which he claimed he was ill, "right down in bed." The court
refused to admit on this phase of the case, or at least refused to take into consideration, the plaintiff's own admission that his "testimony" given at the official investigation was false. The court refused to permit defendant to
prove that the union, the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, sole bargaining agent and the other party with the
defendant to the contract, was never agreeable to reinstatement of this man at any time, which was a necessary requirement under the contract and which was occasioned by plaintiff's own delay in petitioning for reinstatement. And last,
and to our minds most important of all, the court disregarded
the fact that the parties had, in keeping with the underlying
concept of the Railway Labor Act, adjusted their differences between themselves pursuant to a negotiated contract.
The latter again involved the court's complete disregard of
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the plaintiff's own admission that he had falsified at the
hearing, and occupied an untenable position both at the hearing and later in seeking reinstatement. It involved a total disregard by the court of plaintiff's voluntary abandonment of
his claim and his assurance given to defendant that the
claim was withdrawn and the case closed.
It is incredible. No system of law, no body of rules
or principles, which makes any pretension to distinguishing
right from wrong, to working justice between men, to maintaining social control, can countenance such an intolerable
travesty as is reflected in the disposition of this case. It is
not merely erroneous in law, it is monstrous and immoral.
We respectfully submit that the case should be remanded to the District Court with instructions to enter j udgment in favor of the defendant of "no cause of action."
Respectfully submitted,
BRYAN P. LEVERICH,
M. J. BRONSON,
A. U. MINER,
HOWARD F. CORAY,
D. A. ALSUP,

Counsel for
Defendant and Appellant.
10 South Main Street,
Salt Lake City, Utah.
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